As China accelerates satellite launches and commercial deals for its answer to SpaceX’s Starlink, the race to deploy low Earth orbit (LEO) broadband is splitting into two rival blocs: one backed by Western democracies and the other by Beijing.
At stake are not only billions in commercial and government contracts, but also digital sovereignty, military reach and the ability for developing nations to access modern internet infrastructure.
China’s Spacesail has deployed about 90 of a planned 14,000 satellites for its Qianfan constellation since August 2024. The operator is counting on a sharp increase in launch cadence to add roughly 500 more satellites this year, with worldwide services slated sometime in 2025. However, there have been rumors that a recent launch tender went unfilled.
Still, backed by strong state support, the world’s second most populous country is on track to join a select club of global LEO broadband providers as space becomes an increasingly strategic domain.
U.S.-based Starlink and OneWeb from French multi-orbit operator Eutelsat’s are currently the only fully operational LEO broadband networks, with more than 7,800 and 650 satellites in orbit, respectively.
Amazon has deployed 54 of a planned 3,200 satellites for its Project Kuiper constellation.
Canada’s flagship geostationary operator Telesat expects to begin deploying its Lightspeed network of nearly 200 satellites next year, while German venture Rivada Space Networks plans to begin deploying operational satellites for its nearly 600-strong Outernet constellation in 2026.
While Qianfan (also known as Thousand Sails and G60 Starlink) appears to be technologically modeled on Starlink, which is authorized to deploy up to 12,000 satellites and is seeking regulatory approval for an additional 30,000, the contest between them spans beyond capability into values, alliances and control over who connects the unconnected.
Unlike Starlink, Qianfan is not initially targeting mass-market consumers. Instead, the constellation is being positioned as a state-backed space backbone, focused on telecom operators, government clients and enterprise users in countries aligned with or courted by China’s Belt and Road initiative, a global infrastructure and influence campaign launched more than a decade ago.
What’s emerging, analysts say, is a battleground where governments, militaries and critical industries face a choice between a handful of megaconstellations such as Starlink and Qianfan, or a smaller cohort of less dominant players. And while performance metrics like speed, latency and cost still matter, the more decisive factor may be political alignment and the values that come bundled with it.
Commercial foundations
China is already laying the groundwork to expand its influence in the LEO broadband market, targeting early-stage partnerships to secure regulatory access, build trust with governments and position Qianfan as a viable alternative to Western offerings.
Spacesail (also known as Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology, or SSST) has signaled negotiations with roughly 30 countries and has so far announced early commercial arrangements in at least four of them: Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand and Kazakhstan. While these agreements help establish local partnerships and regulatory goodwill, they also mark the early stages of a broader campaign to claim market share and political influence across emerging digital economies.
Analysts expect China to target most ‘Belt and Road’ countries, encompassing much of the Global South and a significant share of the world’s population.
Starlink is already available in Brazil and Malaysia, has plans to begin services in Kazakhstan this year after recently getting regulatory approval, and is awaiting permission to serve Thailand.
A Eutelsat spokesperson said OneWeb is providing services in all of these countries apart from Malaysia, where it is awaiting regulatory approval.
Spacesail is also not the only large LEO constellation China has in the works.
In December, the country began deploying a far more secretive constellation dubbed Guowang that is projected to include 13,000 satellites.
The lack of transparency surrounding Guowang has fueled speculation that it carries dual-use or national security payloads, drawing comparisons to Starshield, SpaceX’s classified U.S. government-focused program.
Guowang has also been slower to develop overall, making rapid international expansion unlikely.
According to French space situational awareness firm Aldoria, Spacesail and Guowang are part of a drive toward digital sovereignty and militarization, intended to do far more than reduce global dependence on Western infrastructure.
“The fact that these initiatives are directly supported by the Chinese state heightens fears that they could be used for military purposes and mass surveillance,” Aldoria said in a May report on the country’s space activities.
“China is not content simply to catch up with the United States; it is actively deploying systems capable of disrupting, neutralizing and monitoring adversary infrastructures,” the report added.
That level of political ambition also comes with deep financial firepower. Spacesail secured about $943 million in government-led Series A funding in early 2024 to advance the constellation. Genesat, the operator’s satellite manufacturing subsidiary, also raised $137 million in late December to help accelerate production.
Such state support isn’t unique to China. Satellite operators worldwide are increasingly seen as strategic national assets, especially as LEO broadband constellations become entangled in defense, diplomacy and critical infrastructure.
In the U.S., SpaceX has garnered billions of dollars in government contracts, helping transform it into the world’s most dominant launch provider and, in turn, the largest satellite operator. In 2024, SpaceX flew 138 missions, more than double China’s 68 record launches, four of which supported Thousand Sails and Guowang.
Canada has also invested billions in Telesat to get its Lightspeed constellation off the ground.
Meanwhile, in Europe, France plans to double its stake in Eutelsat as part of a capital increase worth about $1.6 billion. French President Emmanuel Macron was cited June 20 urging for even more investment to counter growing U.S. and Chinese influence in LEO, calling on the Gulf, India, Canada and Brazil in particular to rally behind a Europe-led response.
Choosing sides
With multiple constellations gaining momentum, governments must now weigh not only connectivity needs but also the geopolitical implications of who provides this increasingly vital service.
The tensions they face between political alignment and commercial opportunity are likely to echo those that recently played out in the terrestrial wireless industry, according to Armand Musey, a space industry analyst and founder of the advisory firm Summit Ridge Group.
“Most Western countries will avoid Qianfan due to its Chinese heritage, as they avoid [Chinese equipment vendor] Huawei for their terrestrial networks,” Musey said.
Likewise, he expects many Eastern bloc–aligned or non-Western countries to embrace the Chinese constellation while avoiding Western alternatives, mirroring their current resistance to Nordic telecom vendors Ericsson and Nokia.
“Then there will be a fight over countries in the middle, particularly developing countries, which will seek to pit the two sides against each other to get the best deal,” he added.
That said, set-up costs to access a LEO network are low compared with traditional wireless infrastructure, meaning countries may not have to choose between Starlink and Qianfan.
Instead, Musey said less developed countries in Africa and Latin America may decide to split traffic across constellations, balancing geopolitical alignment with economic and operational incentives.
And while price is important for LEO broadband — along with speed, latency and reliability — so too is the perception of privacy.
“Some countries will need assurance that their traffic is not going to the U.S. government,” Musey said, “and others will need assurances that traffic is not going to the Chinese government or sites being blocked by the Chinese government.”
Blaine Curcio, a senior advisor at boutique consultancy firm Novaspace, said SpaceSail is trying to position itself as a “fairer” partner than Starlink, which provides services directly and via resellers.
“It’s notable that their second [Memorandum of Understanding] came with Measat, an existing Starlink reseller,” Curcio said via email.
“Starlink went into Malaysia very aggressively,” he said, citing an industry conversation suggesting it had onboarded more than 70 Starlink resellers in the country. SpaceX and Measat did not respond to requests for comment.
“At least for now, SpaceSail seems to be positioning themselves as more of a ‘win-win cooperation’ type of partner,” he said.
SpaceSail is also likely to stay clear of the consumer broadband markets, he said, and stick to selling to telcos, satellite operators and existing service providers.
SpaceSail’s Strategic Announcements
| Brazil | November 2024: Signed a cooperation agreement with Brazil’s Ministry of Communications, covering satellite communications, 5G, digital infrastructure and broadband access. |
| Malaysia | February 2025: Signed an MoU with flagship geostationary operator Measat to collaborate on LEO broadband services, direct-to-device communications and Internet of Things (IoT) solutions. |
| Thailand | April 2025: Secured a strategic cooperation agreement with Thailand’s Ministry of Digital Economy and Society, potentially leading to pilot programs in rural provinces. |
| Kazakhstan | June 2025: Established a local subsidiary at a Kazakhstani financial hub in Astana, with a capital investment of $17 million. |
New international dynamics
LEO broadband networks are global by design. At this low-latency altitude, satellites move rapidly across the Earth and cover only small areas at a time, meaning operators must deploy hundreds or even thousands of them to deliver seamless, continuous coverage.
Maximizing international subscriber numbers is therefore key to sustaining these huge constellations financially. As geopolitical tensions rise between the U.S. and China, establishing a broader global LEO footprint also provides leverage in diplomacy, defense and digital influence.
It remains to be seen how difficult China intends to make it for Starlink, OneWeb and other Western operators to gain footholds in regions where it is promoting its own services.
“Starlink is ahead of Qianfan, but if the Chinese government subsidizes it significantly, that will be a challenge for Starlink,” Musey said.
He noted that Starlink also faces growing competition from Project Kuiper, which is backed by Amazon’s deep financial resources and could be bundled with its Prime service to accelerate adoption and growth.
Countries already leveraging Huawei and telecom equipment from China’s ZTE are also well-positioned for the Chinese LEO satellite integration efforts that are likely coming on the horizon.
“If we assume that satellite will comprise a meaningful percentage of future telco networks, it’s a natural fit for companies like these to integrate satellite into their 6G offerings, especially considering their presence across a lot of Belt and Road countries,” Curcio said.
Starlink has already made inroads with telcos that leverage Chinese wireless networking equipment in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines.
“From a Chinese soft power perspective, it would seem a real shame to let all that Huawei and ZTE-built 3G/4G/5G infrastructure get superseded by Starlink,” Curcio said.
Still, analysts expect Qianfan to have limited impact on Western constellations in the near term, given minimal overlap in their core markets.
Chinese constellations are unlikely to compete for work on Europe’s planned multi-orbit IRIS² sovereign broadband constellation, the Canadian government contracts Telesat is lining up for or any of the markets Amazon has initially outlined.
And although SpaceSail is gaining traction with international MoUs, key commercial elements like term sheets, pricing and binding contracts have yet to emerge.
“With that said, in some markets that are more neutral, such as Malaysia, Brazil, South Africa, there is probably some short-medium term impact insofar as players in these markets now see a plausible alternative, especially in the form of Thousand Sails/Qianfan,” Curcio continued.
“If I’m a satellite service provider in a place like Malaysia or Brazil, I am now probably trying to play these constellations off one another, to some extent, so for Western constellations, they might find a harder bargain being driven in these places.”
This article first appeared in the July 2025 issue of SpaceNews Magazine.